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Sorting, typing, classifying 
The elephants in our ethnographic rooms 
Katharina Schramm, Claire Beaudevin 
Figure 1. Photograph of ‘The Elephant in the Room’ installation by Banksy (Los Angeles, 2006). 
Source: http://www.banksy.co.uk/. 
The elephant in the room is huge, but quiet. It is so taken for granted that it melts into the 
tapestry. Nobody in the room notes its presence. Though disregarded, it is still strikingly 
present, a massive force that people must walk around if they wish to move within the room. 







The metaphor of this troubling pachyderm, of course, is well known and widely used (see, 
for example, Krueger 2017; Thomas 2016). The figurative elephant in the room alludes to 
issues that seem obvious, but are so disturbing that they are actively ignored or put aside to 
ensure business as usual. In our view, the resulting spectrum of ignorance goes from 
voluntary blindness to the point where, hidden in plain sight, the obvious and disturbing 
issues may actually not be known by some of the protagonists.  
In this think piece, which accompanies our special section on the problem of classification in 
ethnography, we suggest that matters of classification, categorization, and typology in all of 
their shades constitute an ‘elephant in the room’ of ethnographic field research and writing, 
both an obvious and invisible part of our anthropological epistemology. We decided to use 
the metaphor of the elephant in the room to guide us in this text, as we address questions of 
methodology, positionality, epistemology, and representation in ways we deem heuristic.  
The elephants of classification 
In their various shades (in terms of ancestry, class differences, diagnostic categories, racial 
and ethnic labels, and their many intersections), classifications in governmental and medical 
practice, among others, are extremely powerful, implying material effects for the subject(s) 
they target. They shape the epistemic space of what is thinkable, conceivable, and targetable. 
Unavoidably, the resulting categories include as well as exclude, often simultaneously. They 
can be tools and obstacles at the same time, and have profound impacts on the lives and 
bodies of both humans and nonhumans. In that sense, they are deeply relational and 
contingent; their effects vary depending on their specific articulation in practices. Their 
arbitrariness may play out between different actors as well as within individual subjects, as 
classificatory violence and social entitlement may go hand in hand; think, for instance, about 
the boundaries and privileges of citizenship, as explored by Nguyen (2010), Krause and 
Schramm (2011), Heinemann and Lemke (2014), and others.  
In medical anthropology and the anthropology of science, where our own research is 
situated, we constantly encounter categorizations that help in making up people (Hacking 
1986) and constitute natureculture worlds (Subramaniam 2014). Our interlocutors – among 
them clinicians, policy makers, epidemiologists, and lab scientists – often base their daily 
work decisions on standardized classifications. They do so explicitly, as part of their routine 
epistemic practices. These common categorizations (of disease, risk, or ancestry, for 
example) are intertwined with attributions of and assumptions about other difference-
making categories: class, race and ethnicity, or religious belonging inform the epistemic 
practice of classification and have a profound impact on the intended social, scientific, and 
clinical outputs (see Subramaniam 2014). We both encountered such intertwinements in our 







fieldwork: in the context of medical genetics in Oman for instance, clinicians frequently 
assume that the specific branch of Islam their patients belong to influences their opinions 
about prenatal diagnosis and medical termination of pregnancy. However, as it is not socially 
acceptable to inquire about this obedience, practitioners use a patient’s name, address, 
physical appearance, clothing, or accent as a proxy for their religious affiliation. Depending 
on their resulting impression, they may mention the official ruling of the Saudi clerics (with 
patients thought to be Ibadi or Sunni) or decide not to raise the religious question at all (with 
those thought to be Shia). Or, to remain within the field of human genetics, many sampling 
decisions involved in the creation of biogeographically stratified databases in population 
genomics operate on assumed correlations among territory, language, culture, and body that 
link back to the time of colonial race science. So-called ancestral populations are thereby 
constructed as rather homogenous and place-bound. Despite geneticists’ emphasis on the 
complex relationship between phenotype and genotype, and despite the explicit rejection of 
racial typology in contemporary genomics, race remains a sticky and troubling absent-
presence that is hard to pin down (see M’charek, Schramm, and Skinner 2014).    
For some of the protagonists of our fieldwork, who perform the daily work of 
categorization, such (historical) relationships get sidelined in favor of pragmatic decision 
making. For others, especially those who are subject to the ordering gaze, the resulting 
categorizations may turn out to be deeply problematic and politically charged. Just like the 
metaphorical elephant lingering next to the sofa, the presence of difference-making 
categorizations in clinical and scientific practice is often palpable but not necessarily 
recognized or addressed by individuals who nevertheless practice them. As anthropologists, 
we might observe them, yet we are not always prone to discuss them explicitly, especially 
when considering the multilayered and arbitrary role of categories of difference in practice. 
The absence of discussion about the existence and performative power of multiple and 
intersectional categorizations by those who use them tends to simplify and naturalize them: 
in the local moral worlds where they are valid, they are taken for granted. 
The fact that such powerful social phenomena are rarely discussed poses profound 
methodological, epistemic, and ethical challenges to ethnography. Certainly, we need to ask 
how categories and standards are forged and employed, and what kinds of work they 
perform (Bowker and Star 2000; Bauer and Wahlberg 2009; Lampland and Star 2009). 
However, we also need to acknowledge that our own anthropological practices also include 
arbitrary classificatory work and may unintentionally reinforce the very categories they intend 
to unravel. Offering the concept of ‘classificatory violence’, scholars like Flood and Starr 
(2019), Pollock (2012), and Schramm, Krause, and Valley (2019) urge anthropologists to 
attend to inequality and power relations that shape classificatory practices. We ask: what 
kinds of epistemological dilemmas do anthropologists encounter if they want to both take 
their interlocutors seriously and provide nuanced accounts of their practices?  







In the following sections, we reflect on this issue by considering the elephant of 
classification as a material-semiotic creature that calls for a careful consideration of 
positionality and situatedness in our interlocutors’ practices as well as our own. We start by 
zooming out of the first image of this think piece and attending to the surroundings of the 
pachyderm and their settings. This allows us to focus on the importance of situatedness and 
ethnographic attentiveness as necessary abilities for anthropologists to acknowledge and 
write about the elephants of classification in their fieldwork. We also deal with ways of 
liberating the metaphorical elephant when we propose not to give in to the dichotomous 
temptation that comes with classification. We stress the importance of historicizing the 
elephant’s presence, shape, and role, as a first step, maybe, to driving it out of the room.     
Of concealed, tamed, and painted elephants in anthropology 
The image we have chosen to accompany our text offers a felicitous entry point to address 
these issues. It is titled ‘The Elephant in the Room’ and is taken from Banksy’s ‘Barely Legal’ 
show, which took place in Los Angeles in 2006.1 In the position of the audience, we look at 
the scene from the outside. Spray-painted in red with golden fleurs-de-lis, Tai, a thirty-eight-
year-old female Elephas maximus is spectacular, yet camouflaged. The elephant fits into the 
setting; it takes the center of the stage. In the original Banksy performance, the elephant 
symbolized ‘poverty’, that problem of which everybody is aware but willfully ignores. For 
our purposes, we want to draw attention to the staged character of the scene: neither the 
living room nor the painted elephant are ‘natural’. Likewise, classificatory processes are not 
natural; they need continuous work in order to be shared, sustained, and performed. This 
work involves taming: an unruly elephant would destroy the scene, making it impossible to 
overlook. But Tai, who had performed in numerous popular films, was taught to follow 
commands and fulfilled her prescribed role. Classifications also imply taming: their very 
purpose is to organize the world so that it can be grasped, understood, described (and thus 
discussed), and controlled. This organizing work produces tensions between the general and 
the specific, the standardized and the personal, as well as the normative and the queer.  
Thirty years back, the sociologist Susan Leigh Star (1990) demonstrated the importance of 
paying attention to and caring for that which does not fit. In considering ‘monstrous’ 
arrangements that do not fit neatly into our binary classifications, she argues that both 
 
1  John Akomfrah’s more recent contribution to the 2019 Venice Biennale ‘The Elephant in the Room: 
Four Nocturnes’ uses the metaphor to address yet another universe of planetary relations. We have 
chosen to stay with Banksy’s performance because of its staged character and its straightforwardness 
as an illustration. 







violent erasure as well as misrecognition could be potentially deadly. In her seminal piece 
‘Power, Technology and the Phenomenology of Conventions: On Being Allergic to Onions ’ 
she develops a ‘theory of multiple membership’ in which she questions the self-evident 
status of standardizations, and asks about the possibilities and limitations of alternative, 
more accommodating forms of classification (Star 1990, 26). Star points out the cost that is 
involved in membership: the exclusions, cutting, and covering, in other words, the taming of 
complexity that is involved in all modes of belonging. She also shows that heterogeneity and 
multiplicity cannot be resolved by more splinterings or compartmentalizations. Instead, she 
wants us to acknowledge the tensions, urging us to leave room for more fluid arrangements 
and to start from what she calls the ‘Zero Point’, that is, a point ‘between dichotomies’ that 
allows to think in new ways about technosocial assemblages (Star 1990, 47, 53).  
However, as the think pieces of this special section show, clinical practice is more often than 
not guided by forms of classification that aim to produce clear-cut boundaries: you receive 
the test or you don’t (see McDowell in this special section); you are entitled to access the 
health care facility or you aren’t (see Brenman in this special section). Better inclusiveness 
may be attempted by adding or accommodating group labels (see Brenman in this special 
section), thereby shifting the boundary between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’, while keeping 
the very distinction intact. The work of classification takes place within a complex 
assemblage of links and relations: making one category fit – including with the help of well-
wishing anthropologists who take part in feeding the elephant of classification – may 
produce new exclusions, new blind spots (see Moyer in this special section). Certainly, the 
additional presence of the anthropologist in the room already filled by the elephant adds a 
layer of interesting complexity to the scene. 
Moving (around) elephants: Situatedness, positionality, and writing 
Star writes (1990, 52): ‘Power is about whose metaphor brings worlds together and holds 
them there. ... Metaphors may heal or create, erase or violate, impose a voice or embody 
more than one voice’. Returning to Banksy’s installation: a journalist tells us that Tai 
remained calm and played along (Oliver 2006). She was an experienced performer, as her 
keepers assured the press. But the act of painting her body drew the attention of the animal 
welfare authorities, who ordered that she be scrubbed clean of the potentially toxic paint. 
Local authorities ruled that she had to remain in the staged living room for the time of the 
performance without her camouflaging paint. Thus cleansed, Tai stood out in the room, 
losing the purpose the artist had intended for her.  
Having shifted positionalities (back and forth from ‘art piece’ to ‘political message’ to ‘animal 
welfare symbol’), the example of Tai may help us think through the methodological 







challenges that we face when dealing with the work of classification. Who indeed has the 
power to paint or to scrub clean, to display or conceal? With this metaphor of the elephant 
in the room, we try to maintain an awareness of relationality and power in our consideration 
of classificatory practices. Here we need to go deeper than merely acknowledging the 
discomfort and tension that appear when facing the disturbing categorization/elephant. 
How can we begin to think from Star’s point ‘between dichotomies’ as the space of tension? 
Facing unfamiliar categorizations, how can we stay in the place of generative epistemic 
disconcertment, which Helen Verran (2013) marks as the site for ‘doing difference together’, 
thereby allowing for new ethnographic alliances? This, we argue, would allow for more 
inclusive practices of anthropological work that do not pretend to be all encompassing (and 
thus totalitarian). In our view, the elephant of classification can be tackled methodologically 
in two ways: a) by paying attention to situatedness and positionality, and b) by cultivating 
ethnographic attentiveness and forms of writing that do not ignore the elephant, or pretend 
to, but engage with it.  
Questions of positionality have been extensively and critically discussed among 
anthropologists, entering the mainstream of the discipline with the Writing Culture debate 
(Clifford and Marcus 1988), if not earlier. These discussions about representation as a 
powerful and situated practice destabilized the earlier idea that ethnography is equivalent to 
‘reading over the shoulders’ (Geertz 1973, 452) of cultural insiders, and suggested instead 
that anthropologists have problematically interpreted cultural texts from an unmarked 
position of presumed superiority. Attempts to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with interlocutors 
have ranged from collective research and writing (Fortun et al. 2014; Lewis and Russell 2011) 
to more explicit forms of solidarity (TallBear 2014). These writings emphasize that the 
researcher’s presence always makes a difference, that ethnographers are ourselves 
protagonists in our stories. As anthropologists have come to realize, the ‘God-trick’ 
(Haraway 1989) that would apply a view from nowhere is unfeasible. Ethnography is now 
widely understood to be all about situatedness, and to draw its strength from the meticulous 
analysis of concrete settings and relationships (see Gluckman 1940; Clarke, Friese, and 
Washburn 2018) as well as their historical formation. Ethnographic methods call for an 
explicit consideration of multiple positionalities and their impacts in our analysis, and of the 
several blind spots that emerge from our own involvement and standpoints. In fact, 
acknowledging the situatedness of our knowledge production may allow us to find better 
ways of recognizing intersectional overlaps in classificatory practices (Collins 1986; Haraway 
1989; Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013).  







Positionality makes a difference: you may not realize the elephant’s presence when you are 
inside the room (be it the living room, the triage room, or the project room) because you 
have already accommodated it; it has become part of the routine scenery. In other words, 
you could be experiencing ‘actors’ blindness’ (Bowker and Star 2000), ‘where the system’s 
description of reality becomes true’. Or you may need to actively ignore it, so that you can 
keep your focus (like the woman in the opening photograph who is absorbed in her reading). 
This work of actively ignoring can take different forms, depending on whether you sit on the 
sofa or lean on one of the walls. During fieldwork, we might bump into the elephant at first, 
and then follow the example of other individuals who pretend they do not see it as they walk 
around it. Perhaps we still notice it but then become absorbed in other things, just as some 
of our interlocutors do. Shifting locations therefore helps us to situate the elephant and to 
follow its moves. However, reflecting on the ontological weightiness of the elephant and the 
presumed given-ness of the ‘room’ as the ethnographic scene does not mean we consider 
them to be fixed parameters in our ethnographic spaces. Explicit work on positionalities is 
also necessary to delineate how complicit we might be in setting up the space that holds the 
elephant, the elephant itself, and their unquestionable materiality. 
Figure 2. Photo by Bit Boy (2016). Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/bitboy/246805948. 
From the outside, we may indeed see different things. The second image shows how the 
installation is arranged to draw our gaze to the elephant (as well as the artificial space of 
which it is a part, including here the fence). Familiar with the saying, we may first think of 







the symbolic meaning of the elephant in the room. We may also consider not only how she 
interacts with the material environment (the furniture, the tapestry), but also her various 
relationships with her caregivers, the other actors in the room, or with us, the spectators. 
Similarly, ethnographers in settings where the work of sorting, typing, and classifying is part 
of professional routines may choose to shift their position and point of view, scaling up and 
down, so as to be able to spot the conspicuous elephants as well as the mundane 
relationships that have stabilized the working arrangement. 
At this point, our second methodological consideration – ethnographic attentiveness – 
becomes relevant, as does the question of how we can nurture such attentiveness in our 
writing. If we think about writing ethnographically about the fleur-de-lis-covered room, we 
might imagine ourselves first sitting next to and talking with the woman on the sofa, and 
then stepping out and talking to the spectators, and then describing these different actors 
and contexts. However, we should not assume that ethnographers are the only actors on the 
move, or that the local protagonists in our stories are prisoners of their circumstances (and 
are therefore bound and fixed to one room). Nina Glick-Schiller’s (2010) important critique 
of methodological nationalism, which remains common in migration studies and other 
ethnographic work, calls attention to the problem of fixed categories and the epistemological 
limitations resulting from it.  
We are not suggesting that researchers ignore the significance of categorizations and labels. 
On the contrary, the ethnographer is called upon to describe and analyze how certain 
categories are brought about, the kind of work they do, and how we can historicize them. 
How did the woman come to sit on the sofa? What is she reading? How and when did the 
elephant enter the room and how is it related to the content of her book? What routines 
have developed around it, what traces does it set? In genealogical terms, it also involves 
asking what elephant was there before this one, whether it was bigger or smaller or even 
standing in another room, and what ghostly presence it might still have. As ethnographers, 
we cannot afford to ignore the elephant; we must consider it as a living and breathing being, 
not a prop. As recent scholarship in science and technologies studies has shown, standards, 
classifications, and indicators are not static, neutral, or dead; they inhabit complex worlds 
(Rottenburg and Merry 2015).  
So, what practices of ethnographic attention and writing allow us to shed light on the actions 
of classification (without reproducing the unquestioned hierarchies of truths, or falling into 
the trap of naive relativism)? In their account of ‘complexities’, John Law and Annemarie 
Mol (2002) suggest starting with alternative forms of arranging and ordering ethnographic 
material. Through listing, mapping, and rearranging, we can focus on multiple relations that 
constitute, stabilize, or dissolve classificatory objects, rendering them relevant or irrelevant. 







We can also draw attention to implicated (and concealed!) actors (Clarke and Star 2008) 
while avoiding the problematic paternalism of ‘giving voice’ to others. These techniques of 
writing and analyzing need to achieve the difficult aim of keeping the tension between 
categories in place, without falling for one dichotomy or another. This is what we call 
‘liberating the elephant’. 
In our view, the edginess, loose ends, and unresolved contradictions of ethnographic writing 
need not be erased but rather sharply delineated. This involves working through, around, 
about, and with the elephant, with the very categories of difference and belonging that are 
part of the field situations we are investigating. Such writing may happen in experimental 
formats or more conventional ethnographic styles. Against the primacy of visual 
categorization (Haraway 1989), we may acknowledge other sensual aspects in our work, 
including the epistemic dimension of affective relations (Stodulka, Selim, and Mattes 2018). 
Certainly, we sense the elephant’s warmth and can smell it, even if we do not see it. 
We should also attend to the ghosts that haunt contemporary knowledge production 
(Subramaniam 2014) in order to arrive at better research practices, both in anthropology and 
the fields we study. Among these ghostly presences are those racialized, classed, and 
gendered forms of classification that mark hierarchical differences. They are often inscribed 
in research designs and analytical practices without explicit mention or recognition. The 
relevance of ethnographic work, then, is derived from modest interventions in and irritations 
of such practices, not in providing all-encompassing alternatives (for example, new ad hoc 
classifications). The goal is not to get rid of the elephant but to engage with it. Such 
engagement, as we have already outlined, can take different forms. Certainly, the elephant, 
once recognized, causes disturbance. But it also invites us to share in its tactile sensibility: 
touching, reaching out, and treading carefully. We might also derive fresh ideas from the 
surreal arrangement that puts the elephant at center stage of an otherwise well-ordered 
scheme. The metaphorical elephant might then also signal a move against classification, 
marking that which cannot be sorted, typed, or classified. In any case, we should not take the 
categories we encounter, nor their effects and effectiveness for granted.   
Some of the elephants of our ethnographic rooms: About the 
think pieces in this special section  
The three think pieces that accompany this introductory essay face their elephants in 
different ways. They shed light on ‘in-between situations’, exploring the cracks left open by 
usual classifications. For example, they discuss circumstances where health care practitioners 
divert a globalized, standardized logic of categorization in their daily practice (Beaudevin and 
Pordié, 2016): basing his treatment decisions on a sense of personal responsibility for the 







global health funding spent on the testing of his patients, the Indian TB specialist described 
by McDowell moves away from the clinical categorization framework defined by the 
program developers. The think pieces also demonstrate how, in other situations, individuals 
may strive to refine an obviously problematic classification system in order to produce 
inclusion, thereby creating layers and cumulative changes. As ethnographers, our three 
colleagues pay attention to the dilemmas and critical moments arising from the tension 
between generalization and specificity, population and individual that inform their 
interlocutors’ work. They explore the tinkering practices that evolve around triage, and the 
limitations and capacities of notions of ‘deservingness’. Finally, they pay attention to the 
multiple ways that various actors in their fields relate to boundary-setting elephants, often 
marked by commonsense notions of race, ethnicity, citizenship, and economic status.  
Some of these practices explicitly contest invisibilization, that is, they recognize the 
discomforting and space-taking presence of the elephant of classification and try to address 
it. However, as the three think pieces make clear, they cannot fully dissolve it or otherwise 
make it disappear. In our view, the stickiness2 of categorizations is part of the ethnographic 
challenge: to acknowledge and demonstrate the power of classificatory practices by paying 
close attention to how they are brought about as well as to the multifarious and often 
arbitrary work they perform. Hence, the necessity for anthropologists to accept the 
discomfort that classifications cause: they are at once tools and obstacles, opening and 
closing off opportunities. Starting from this location of discomfort allows for a mode of 
critique that demonstrates that the social, epistemic, and economic relations shaped by 
classificatory practices are not necessarily static nor fixed, but dynamic and thus open to 
change.  
Natassia Brenman’s elephant of classification dwells in a UK mental health care center, 
where it is tamed and trained by the practitioners. Her piece shows the mental health 
practitioners and caregivers trying to enrich and broaden a categorization system they deem 
problematic, with the paradoxical (and expected) impact of increasing inclusiveness. At first 
disturbed by the ‘Black and Minority Ethnic’ (BME) category defining the beneficiaries of 
the center, Brenman could have addressed this trouble by tearing the BME label apart and 
critically discussing its historical, political, and social stakes without acknowledging the 
generative and inclusive potential of the categorization. Instead, she decided to do both. 
Using Haraway’s (2016) evocative metaphor of ‘staying with the trouble’, Brenman looks at 
 
2  Thanks to Janina Kehr for this relevant image. We use this term in a slightly different sense from Sara 
Ahmed’s (2004) original concept, which emphasizes an embodied dimension of attachment that is 
not central to our argument here. 







how the BME category is crafted, enacted, and adjusted – first to BAME (Black, Asian, and 
Minority Ethnic) and then to BAMER, with the ‘R ‘for Refugee – in relation to the shifting 
institutional needs and clients’ claims.  
Andrew McDowell’s paper takes us to a tuberculosis clinic in India, where disease-specific 
programs in global health are implemented, and where clinicians use a highly technological 
and informative instant test made freely available by global health philanthropists to better 
diagnose TB in children. But this test is not used according to the predefined categories of 
‘deservingness’ that come along with it: the physicians add their own category of patient, the 
‘most needing’, which they evaluate on the spot through ‘intuitive class assessment’. The 
elephant in this TB clinic is the relationship of the health care practitioner’s morally 
informed decisions to the patient’s healing path. McDowell draws our attention to the 
limitations of standardizations and categories of deservingness that ignore the richly layered 
local social fabric in which clinicians work. Their decisions may be impacted by other factors 
than those shaping the work of the designers of global health programs. McDowell’s clinic is 
a room occupied by several elephants that may stand in each other’s way or clot up the 
clinical practice. 
The elephant of class introduced by Eileen Moyer is, paradoxically, the result of the 
disappearance of a previous pachyderm: the one of masculinity. In the context of HIV care 
in eastern and southern Africa, the piece shows the role of global health practitioners as well 
as anthropologists in shaping risk categories and designing target populations for global 
health interventions. However, by focusing on gender and sexuality alone (thereby ‘making 
up’ specific categories such as adolescent boys, men who have sex with men, or expecting 
fathers), they produce a huge elephant in the HIV-prevention room, namely class difference. 
Moyer asks: What might be gained by recognizing and engaging with this particular elephant 
from the perspective of public health and also from anthropology? What happens to social 
theories of gender inequality, agency, and risk if we reconfigure middle-class men as ‘at risk’? 
At the end of the elephant trail, concluding thoughts  
We started by exploring how and why we should acknowledge, point to, walk around, write 
about, liberate, care for, and sometimes help drive away the elephants of classification we 
face in our ethnographic rooms and field sites. At the end of this trail, we are convinced that 
a dynamic, relational, and multiscalar practice (in fieldwork, writing, academic policies, and 
political practice) is the way out of the overcrowded room. Our piece begins to outline such 
a practice. 







We want to acknowledge the ongoing stickiness of categories of difference, as well as their 
solid, persistent, residual, and/or ghostly presence. These are matters one cannot walk away 
from in ethnographic practice. The metaphorical incursion into the lives of our communal 
elephants is driven by a common desire for a better anthropological practice. Our think 
piece is an account of this incursion, which started with a lively debate in Stockholm in 2018. 
Given the scope of the raised issues, we have no conclusive aspirations, but rather aim at 
launching further discussions with colleagues: what are your own elephant(s), and how do 
you interact and deal with them? 
In posing this question, we acknowledge that the elephant only travels so far. Comparing the 
practices of sorting, typing, and classifying that we encounter (and sometimes produce) in 
our research to enormous animals that may be both disruptive and actively ignored is not 
enough to understand the multiple dimensions of the problems we are dealing with. There is 
more to the crafting of difference(s) than the simple fact that difference is both huge and 
rarely discussed, hence our interest in discussing the power dynamics at play in the making 
and various uses of these categories, their relations to other – seemingly less controversial – 
categories of differentiation, and their situatedness in wider historical and political fields. 
These issues indeed point to a complex landscape of epistemological and ethical discomfort 
that we have to enter and navigate (see Verran 2014). Such a journey invites us to question 
our own complicity, as authors who have to set themselves in the scenes they are writing 
about. It also leads us to search for alternative ways of writing, specifically turning 
discomfort into ways to build new relations across disciplines and epistemic communities as 
well as in academic and activist spaces. Attending to the elephant in the room, so we hope, 
may provide a vantage point that opens an unexpected door in the beautifully patterned 
tapestry of our ethnographic accounts, thus leading us to new pathways in anthropological 
inquiry. 
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